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Performance and the Partial 
Hetty Blades 
 
I wonder what the performers have been doing before I arrive. What stories have been told? 
What rules have been introduced? 
 
I can hear paper rustling. I catch a glimpse of someone looking up from their reading. I 
wonder what they are looking at. I return my gaze to the magic show.  
 
In what follows, I reflect on my experience of two works which draw attention to partial 
experiences for spectators. The experiences are partial in as much as the audience attend 
only part of the duration of the work, or else stays for the whole duration, but is restricted 
in their ability to see every part of the performance. First, I discuss my experience and 
analysis of two sharings of Still Life, by choreographer Hamish MacPherson.1 Still Life 
comprises 11 one-hour performances which overlap during the six hour duration of the 
work. Audiences are invited to attend for one hour and therefore cannot see the work in its 
entirety. Addressing this unconventional structure, I think through how my reading of the 
work is informed by its necessarily partial nature. Second, I draw Still Life into relationship to 
Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible, a work by choreographer Emilie Gallier, which also 
offers a partial experience. This time through the division of the performance space and 
construction of simultaneous worlds, rather than through the temporal structure of the 
work. In bringing these works into dialogue, I explore how experience of performance might 
be both partial and complete. While these artworks deal with the partial in different ways to 
one another, I suggest they raise similar questions, which are pertinent due to the way that 
the modes of attention they provoke are increasingly required in our encounters with 
contemporary dance and performance works as artists rethink the nature of performance. I 
focus on two key ideas: First, I consider how these works raise questions about what it 
means to access a choreographic work and second, how experiences that are 
simultaneously partial and complete rely on new ways of thinking about how we experience 
and analyse performance.  
 
MacPherson describes Still Life as “one work made up of 11 one-hour performances, 
overlapping over six hours. Individual performances do not have specific tickets, audiences 
can enter between noon and 5pm every 30 minutes and stay for an hour” (MacPherson 
2018a). Despite its length, MacPherson suggests the work is not a durational piece because 
it is not about a single thing happening for a long time, but has a more traditional theatrical 
structure in that there are various scenes in which quite different things happen 
(MacPherson 2018b). Before attending the first sharing, I receive an email from MacPherson 
explaining that audiences can enter the performance every half an hour. When I arrive the 
door is closed, implying the performance has already started. There is someone else waiting 
outside the door, unsure whether or not to open it. Together we enter the studio. We loiter, 
not sure where to sit. The studio space is hazy, like a smoke machine has been blowing. 
MacPherson, Paul Hughes and Antonio de la Fe and are moving in the space, which is 
littered with brightly coloured material. In the centre of the room Kimberley Harvey sits 
motionless in her wheelchair, shrouded in various items of clothing and tied up in rope. Her 
 
1 This work is now called NO CLIMAX YET, but has yet to be performed as such.  
 
 
whole body, including her face and head, is covered. The performers are clearly in the 
middle of something. I have entered in the middle, but this is where it starts for me. I sit and 
watch as de la Fe, MacPherson and Hughes continue to move. Harvey remains still. I am 
unsettled by the way that the one person in the group who appears to be disabled remains 
stationary and bound, while three people who appear non-disabled move freely. I feel 
relieved when Harvey starts to untie herself, slowing releasing herself from the fabric and 
rope. I am aware that I don’t have the whole story. I don’t know what has come before or 
whether knowing this would have any bearing on why the scene unsettles me. Have there 
been relationships established that I should know about? What if I am missing some key 




Figure 1: Kimberley Harvey and Hamish MacPherson. Credit: Arturo Bandinelli 
 
The performers re-set themselves into new places. A new scene begins. 
 
Hughes lies on the floor and reads from a series of cue cards to direct de la Fe in various 
tasks. Hughes is mostly still although he moves his arms and face. The tasks he directs de la 
Fe to perform include giving him something to drink and telling him things about himself. At 
times, de la Fe moves Hughes around the space, dragging his body while Hughes remains 
immobile. Hughes’ directions are curt but soft, he adds ‘please’ to the request only once or 






Figure 2: Paul Hughes lies on the floor and directs Antonio de la Fe. Credit: Arturo Bandinelli 
 
Passivity and Agency 
 
The relationship between still and moving or passive and active bodies is a theme that runs 
across both these scenes and is a topic that has been an artistic concern of MacPherson’s 
for some time, resulting in the publication Still Life, currently on its third issue, and a series 
of workshops preceding this work (see MacPherson 2018c). Despite the simplicity of the 
structure, Hughes’ and de la Fe’s duet does not make for easy viewing. There is no explicit 
conflict between the two, but the dynamic between them and Hughes’ performance of 
passivity raises questions for me about ethics of a mobile body enacting immobility that are 
linked to questions about agency. To put it another way, I feel uncomfortable with the idea 
that Hughes is voluntarily inhabiting a mode of being that is often involuntary.  
 
What I realise through watching the exchange between de la Fe and Hughes is that my 
discomfort with the performance of passivity has to do with an assumption that mobility 
and agency are inter-linked and that passive bodies lack agency. The exchanges between 
Hughes and de la Fe and Hughes’ directive role highlight some of the nuances of care 
relationships. The servitude of the moving body reframes my initial assumptions and draws 
attention to the potential agency of the still body.   
 
Passivity has not been theorised extensively in dance and performance studies but there has 
been a fair amount of critical attention paid to stillness, with scholars often drawing 
attention to its potential agency. Notably, Andre Lepecki’s influential book Exhausting 
Dance (2006) positions stillness in dance as a rupture in dance’s historical ontological 
association with movement. For Lepecki, stillness and slowness in choreographic works 
propose a ‘critique of representation’ (2006: 45) and interrogate dance’s ‘political economy’ 




Perspectives such as Lepecki’s that view stillness as a form of resistance pose questions 
about the distinction between voluntary and involuntary stillness. While the decision not to 
engage physically or verbally can be seen as a form of resistance and agency, viewing 
stillness this way relies on an assumption that the still or silent act is a choice. Thinking back 
to my initial response to Still Life, the discomfort I felt at Harvey’s stillness was different to 
Hughes’. I was aware that Harvey was choosing to be still, had chosen to perform in the 
work and was likely to have contributed to the choreographic decisions, so it was not that I 
didn’t recognise her agency in the situation. Nevertheless, the non-disabled performers 
moving, while Harvey remained still and bound and Hughes’ voluntary embodying of 
immobility unsettled me in different ways.  
 
Choosing to be immobile, still, or passive can be fairly easily understood as a form of 
agency, however, when a person’s mobility is shaped through age, illness or disability, 
stillness is arguably more complex. 2 Nevertheless, the assumption that someone who has 
reduced mobility has limited agency is problematic and highlights the valorizing of mobility, 
not only in the history of dance and performance but in culture more generally. As Lepecki’s 
association of modernity with movement highlights, ideas around ‘progress’ in western 
capitalist cultures is linked with movement and the associated quality of productivity, an 
idea mirrored on David Bissell and Gillian Fuller’s book Stillness in a Mobile World (2011).   
 
Bissell and Fuller offer a rethinking of stillness. Interrogating the association of still bodies 
with resistance, they suggest that, “stillness is so often conflated with a reductive 
understanding of resistance where to be still is to resist and to stand against movement, 
with all the determination that this entails” (2011: 2). They go on to suggest that stillness is 
also often associated with a lack of agency: 
 
Stillness is not just a gesture of refusal. Stillness punctuates the flow of all things: 
a queuer in line at the bank; a moment of focus; a passenger in the departure 
lounge; a suspension before a sneeze; a stability of material forms that assemble; 
a passport photo. Each of these stillnesses pulse through multiple ecologies with 
multiple effects. Yet, curiously, stillness is so often anticipated, more or less, as 
an aberration and thus a problem to be dealt with. A moment of emptiness or 
missed productivity, producing a hobbled subjectivity without active agency. 
(2011: 3) 
 
The cultural prioritising of movement arguably underpins views that problematically 
overlook the agency of people with reduced mobility. The performance of various forms of 
stillness in Still Life offers a particular way in to rethinking narratives around illness, aging 
and disability. As Petra Kuppers writes:  
 
Disabled performers are often aware of the knowledges that have been erected 
around them: tragic, poor, helpless, heroic, struggling, etc. In the laboratory of 
the performance situation, these knowledges can be re-examined, and 
questioned again and again. (2003: 3) 
 
 
2 Sarah Whatley (2019) offers a detailed discussion of questions related to agency, stillness and movement in 
relation to photographs and films of disabled dancers in the 11 Million Reasons project. 
 
 
Bissell and Fuller suggest that viewing stillness as a cessation of movement already 
assumes its capacities and that what is needed is to disentangle stillness from 
movement, and a reframing of it as a positive state, rather than a lack or void (2011: 
6). I suggest that my experience of Still Life enabled me to rethink stillness and 
question the association of movement with agency and raised questions about how we 
respond to still and moving bodies. My  differing responses to Hughes’ and Harvey’s 
stillness was shaped by my awareness that I did not have access to the entire work. 
The partial nature of my experience generated my discomfort with the performance of 
involuntary stillness by mobile bodies and with the image of Harvey bound and still 
while the other performers moved freely. My response therefore demonstrates how 
the nature of this performance gave space to an interrogation of my own assumptions. 
Furthermore, the work posed the question to me of how our cultural value systems 
might be reframed to view involuntary stillness as a cultural norm, as opposed to 
associating it in any straightforward way with either agency or a lack thereof.  
 
Stillness is neither a straightforward act of resistance or an indication of a lack of agency. 
Furthermore, dance’s relationship with stillness has shifted since Lepecki’s text was 
published. The use of stillness in Still Life invokes echoes Lepecki’s analysis, but 13 years 
after this text was published, the expectations of ‘dance’ and its political associations have 
shifted. The question of dance’s particular ontology and its relationship to movement is 
arguably less relevant as the boundaries between dance, performance and live art are 
increasingly fluid. The blurring of forms can be attributed to a number of factors, including 
the influence of a body of practice by artists such as Xavier Le Roy and Jerome Bel, which 
prioritises ideas over movement forms. The increased sharing of dance in gallery and 
museum contexts (Wookey 2015) has also brought the form into closer dialogue with 
performative traditions associated with visual and live art. In an artistic climate where 
people working in dance performance frequently draw on movement, speech, text, stillness, 
imagery, emptiness and silence, Lepecki’s suggestion that stillness ruptures the association 
of dance with movement is no longer pertinent.  
 
The lack of clear distinctions between dance, performance and live art means that instead 
of drawing on any clear parameters for what dance is, we identify the form through 
contextual features, such as the place of performance, the way the work is described in the 
programme, and the naming of the artist as a choreographer. In the field of philosophical 
aesthetics, 3  there is some debate regarding which properties are relevant to the identity of 
a work of art. For example, empiricists view the work as categorizable through particular 
properties (see Davies 2005, Lamarque 2010). Under this view, the presence of structured 
movement, for example, might be said to be an essential property required for an event to 
be classified as a dance work, as opposed to another type of performance. However, 
practices such as MacPherson’s which cross multiple categories demonstrate how 
considering essential properties does not help us to establish the classification of a work. 
Indeed, there is a strong argument for resisting any type of classification, however, situating 
a work in relation to other practices helps us to make sense of our experience of it. In order 
to do this, I suggest that it we often draw on contextual, rather than aesthetic features of 
 
3 This term refers to an area of analytic philosophy focused on questions related to the philosophy of art.  
 
 
the work.4 Contextual characteristics might include the work’s style and function as well as 
the identity of the author. Following this line of thinking, MacPherson’s identity as a 
choreographer positions this work in the field of dance, however, this does not mean that 
the work is purely or only a dance work. Importantly, it was made for a festival of 
performance, theatre and live art, meaning it is situated at the intersection of a number of 
performative forms. We can therefore view the stillness in the work, through multiple 
lenses which disentangles it from Lepecki’s association of stillness with a radical rupture to 
dance ontology.  
 
A new day. A new scene. A new studio. 
 
This time, when I enter the performers are dispersed around a large studio. I look for the 
familiar configurations of care I witnessed last time, but they do not appear. Each performer 
is busy with their own task. De la Fe engages the audience in conversation, while Harvey, 
covered in fabric and sitting away from the interaction, provides the prompts. The 
conversation is disjointed but almost makes sense. At first I search for the logic before 
relaxing into the fragmentation of the communication. The prompts repeat at times, 
demonstrating that they arise from a finite bank of possible questions. When it is my turn to 
talk to de la Fe I notice how they choreograph the microphone, moving it between our 
mouths at irregular speeds. I diligently wait for it to be placed in front of my mouth before I 
speak. Sometimes the wait is long, causing a sense of suspense and building anticipation for 
my response. I found the tension between the sense drama cultivated by the choreography 
of the microphone and the futility of the conversation, which makes very little sense 
humorous and engaging.  
 
Next, Harvey directly addresses the audience by asking us what we’d like her to do. At first 
she looks directly at the person she is speaking to, who subsequently requests something 
from her. Later there is a shift as she starts to address the room more generally. In 
response, the audience are quiet, seemingly hesitant to volunteer commands. The shared 
responsibility of the moment results in some suggestions being made but there is a sense of 
reluctance from the audience which wasn’t there when she addressed people directly.  
 
Meanwhile, MacPherson moves very slowly in the centre of the space. 
 
The relationships in these scenes are very different from the first ones that I encountered. 
The dynamics of care and the tensions between active and passive bodies is less evident. 
These are replaced by relationships between the performers and the audience, which 
cultivate different forms of frisson. What emerged for me in these exchanges was a 
reframing of the questions I had about agency during my first encounter. For example, I 
wondered who was in charge of the exchange. I am free to say whatever I want to de la Fe 
but when their responses mis-align with my answers, it is clear that there are rules to the 
game that I am not privy to. It does not matter what I say, I have no way of altering the 
course of the conversation.  
 
 
4 Here I follow contextualist ontologies for art, proposed by Jerrold Levinson (1990), amongst others, by 
suggesting that it is aspects of the work’s context that determine its identity. 
 
 
My reading of this scenario in relation to agency arises from my previous experience of the 
work, rather than solely what I encountered on my second visit. Most audience members, 
will have singular experiences of the work, as they will attend for only one hour. They 
cannot draw on previous images, feelings or memories  to make sense of the scenario they 
encounter. Realising how I am making links between my two experiences of the work raises 
highlights the complexities of analysing works that we have a partial experience of. 
Although I am in the arguably privileged position of having seen two parts of the work, I still 
feel hesitant in my own analysis of it. I am conscious that I am dipping into a pre-existing 
world that will continue after I leave the studio and preoccupied with concerns about 
whether I fully understand the work.   
 
Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible 
 
Emilie Gallier’s work, Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible deals with the partial in a 
different way to MacPherson’s. I attended a performance of this work at Perdu in 
Amsterdam on 14 December 2018. In my role as a supervisor for Gallier’s practice-based 
PhD, I had seen aspects of her practice before, but this was the first time I had seen the 
work in performance.5  
 
The audience are invited into the studio space and offered a drink from the bar. The space is 
dimly lit and a large piece of black paper hangs from the ceiling, delineating one part of the 
space from another. The paper does not extend the entire width of the room, meaning the 
two spaces within the space were not strictly divided. On the side where I stood, some 
chairs are strewn around and stacked at the edge of the space. I catch glimpses of chairs 





5 Gallier's PhD research is ongoing. The performance I attended was open to the public and was not 
part of her PhD assessment. She has given her consent for me to write about the work. 
 
 
Figure 3: Paper separating two sides of the space during a research residency at Regards 
Dansants in Cherbourg, 2017. Credit: Jamillah Sungkar 
 
Gallier welcomes us to the event and gives a short series of instructions as the audience 
stand around her on the side of the paper where we had entered. She offers the group a 
deck of cards and instructs each person to take one. What is depicted on each card 
determines where we should start the performance. Some of the group are instructed to 
leave the room. Another group are told to stay on this side of the paper, and the third 
group, which includes me, are told we can move freely through both parts of the space. The 
group who leave`the room re-enter a few minutes later and walk to the other side of the 
space. They have their eyes closed and are guided by another member of the audience. 
 
I stay on the side of the paper with the bar and watch as a what seems to be a magic show 
commences. Camille Gerbeau and Nina Boas sit at a table along with the audience members 
assigned to this side of the space. The performers generate striking illusions using a large 
piece of folded paper and perform tricks with cups and balls. The people around the table 
study the activities in a serious and focused way. This attention creates and atmosphere 
commonly associated with performance, rather than being reminiscent of the ways people 
might attend to a magic show in another context. 
 
 
Figure 4: Emilie Gallier during a research residency at Regards Dansants in Cherbourg, 2017. 




I remain a short distance from the table, positioned so I can also see part of the other space. 
The performers move between the spaces. I hear noises including the rustling of paper 
coming from the other side of the paper curtain. I am curious, but although I can move 
freely, I challenge myself not to move on every whim. I am acutely aware of my split 
attention, of curiosity about the other side pulling me away from the magic. I play games 
with myself to see how long I can focus on the magic and try to train my attention. 
 
Each time I hear noises from the other space my attention is drawn in that direction. I resist 
moving for at least half an hour. I see how long I can last without looking over to the other 
side of the room. When I fail, I see glimpses of people reading. Some sit on the small 
number of chairs I am able to see. Each time I look the configuration of people and how 
they are positioned has changed a little. I see someone eat some paper. Meanwhile, the 
magic show continues.  
 
While the magic offers a more spectacular aesthetic experience than the reading, I am 
drawn to that which I don’t know. The view of the other side of the space is enticing 
precisely because of its partial nature. 
 
I finally surrender and move to the other space, which is littered with cards inscribed with 
writing and drawings. People are reading, some sit on chairs, under the reading lights while 
others sit and lie on the floor. Large pieces of paper are strewn around the space, the 
remnants of movement I have missed. The action I had heard earlier has finished and there 
is sense of calm. I hear laughter from the other side of the space and wonder what I am 
missing.  
 
The strongest themes that emerges for me during my experience of Papier mutliforme et 
Papier Comestible is how attention can be choreographed and what role the agency of the 
spectator plays in the nature of their experience. This theme materialises through the 
interplay of the content and structure of the work. There is tension between the spectacle 
of the magic show and the internal, relatively static act of reading. Spectacle has a long 
tradition in performance (see Lewis 2010) and is considered in dance in relation to the ways 
the body is choreographed and contextualised (see Burt 2007). Spectacle can be associated 
with explicit displays of virtuosic dance technique. However, in Gallier’s work, the spectacle 
arises through the magic skills of the performers and the striking aesthetic of the large 
pieces of paper that they manipulate. Magic is perhaps one of the most overt forms of 
performance spectacle due to the way its success relies on generating particular visual 
impacts. This aspect of magic is highlighted through its recontextualization in the 
performance work Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible. In contrast, watching someone 
read in their heads is arguably unspectacular in that the people being seen are not 
deliberately cultivating a particular aesthetic or visual experience but engaging in an internal 
process.  
 
The impossibility of seeing both parts of the performance invites me to consider the nature 
of attention in performance. While the audiences for Still Life only access part of the work’s 
duration, in Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible, the audience attend for the whole 
event, but are not able to see it all. This results in a negotiation for the viewer regarding 
how they attend, what they choose to ignore and when they allow themselves to get 
 
 
distracted. This oscillation of attention between aspects of the work is present in any 
encounter with an artwork. As spectators, we select what to look at and where to focus our 
attention. Gallier’s explicit choreography of this split attention encourages us to reflect on 
how we are engaging with and attending to the work. In turn, this highlights how the ways 
we attend to artworks is always partial, even in cases where we can see all of the content of 
the work at once.  
 
Partial performance and dance work ontology 
 
Both Still Life and Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible are works which feature partial 
experiences of the spectators as central to their form. The centrality of the partial has 
ontological implications. A work that cannot be seen in its entirety by any individual 
audience member raises questions about what constitutes a ‘work’ and the expectations we 
have about how such an entity is to be experienced. While MacPherson points out, there 
are traditional aspects of Still Life’s structure (2018b), whether or not the entire piece 
follows the tradition of an over-arching narrative is something that each member of the 
audience can never know. Nevertheless, each individual experience of the work is complete 
and has structure, narrative and form, as demonstrated in the description of my experience. 
Similarly, each person’s experience of Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible comprises a 
unique perspective and no one can see the entire work at once, meaning that each 
individual experience has a singular beginning, middle and end. Therefore, the spectators’ 
experiences of these two works are simultaneously complete and partial.   
 
This particular way of watching raises questions about what it means to access a work, or to 
put it another way: Has anyone ever seen Still Life or Papier mutliforme et Papier 
Comestible?  If I was to attend a performance of a conventional work in a theatre, which 
was one hour long and leave after 30 minutes, can I claim to have seen it? This question is of 
course not exclusive to dance or performance. I might read only two chapters of a 12 
chapter novel. Or fast forward part of a film. The question however, is whether in such cases 
I have read the novel, watched the film or seen the dance work. Instinctively, we might say 
that if we have engaged only partially that we haven’t experienced the work of dance, 
literature or film. Watching Still Life and Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible however, is 
necessarily partial, meaning that each audience’s experience is also complete.  
 
Questions about the features of dance works are discussed in philosophical aesthetics and 
dance studies. Key debates include whether works are abstract ‘types’ or one-off events 
(Davies 2011; McFee 2011; Meskin 1999), what the properties of works might be (Rubidge 
2000; Pakes 2013; Pouillaude 2017) and how they come into existence and are preserved 
and re-enacted (Pakes 2017).  While there is not consensus, many scholars consider the 
type/token schema useful for articulating the relationship between a work and its 
performances. Under this view, a work is an abstract entity or ‘type’ made present through 
physical performances or ‘tokens’. In relation to Still Life, this view would consider each 11 
hour staging of the work as a token of the type Still Life. What then does each viewer 
experience? Perhaps each viewing is part of a token, although each hour spent watching the 
work is also a complete experience. The way that the audience are directed to enter at 30 
minute intervals and stay one hour sets up the experience as a complete performance 
event, albeit not an experience of the full work. We might then suggest that each hour-long 
 
 
experience of the work is a token of Still Life. However, under this schema, although tokens 
can differ from one another, each token is equally an instance of the work. 
 
Thinking of each hour-long performance as a token implies that they are as much an 
instance of the work as the entire 6-hour performance, which doesn’t seem quite right as 
the entire performance differs so significantly in temporal and structural qualities from each 
hour-long experience of it. This quandary highlights one of the limitations of the type/token 
schema, by suggesting that it does not account for performances that involve partial 
experiences as central to their form. An alternative schema is needed to make sense of 
these works. I suggest, therefore that the ontological structure of the entire 6-hour version 
of Still Life is a macro-work or ‘macro-type’ and that each hour-long viewing is a micro-work 
or ‘micro-type’. Each person accesses a micro-work through its token, but no one accesses 
the macro-work, as it is not possible to see this token. This allows for each audience 
member’s experience to be both partial, in that they haven’t experienced the macro-work 
but also complete as they have accessed a full micro-work. The macro and micro work 
structure also aligns with Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible. The entire event can be 
considered the macro work and each audience member’s unique perspective the micro 
work.  
 
This schema complicates the notion of the work as a singular entity manifest through 
variable performances. Suggesting a work can have other works within it offers a new, 
multiple way of thinking about what the work might be. Furthermore, I suggest that the 
question of what it means to access a work extends beyond these two works, or even other 
works which offer consciously partial experiences. Even if I attend a work in a theatre for its 
entire duration, have I really seen it? Even when I read a whole book can I really claim to 
have read it? What kind of attention is required to know that I have really accessed the 
work? The choreography of the partial in Still Life and Papier mutliforme et Papier 
Comestible draws into focus questions about what it means to truly experience at work of 
art.   
 
These questions return us to discussions about empiricism and the appreciation of art 
works. Philosopher David Davies suggests that the term aesthetic empiricism refers to views 
that minimize the role of context or resources, “not available in or derivable from and 
immediate experiential encounter with an instance of a work” (2004: 25). While Davies and 
others have argued against this view, this quote demonstrates an assumption within these 
discourses that we understand implicitly what it means to have an ‘immediate experiential 
encounter’ with a work. What Still Life and Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible highlight 
is that our engagement with performance is always partial and is dependent on engaging 
our attention over the specified duration of the work. Even in more conventional 
performances, it might be that our attention wonders and we therefore miss part of the 
action, despite not leaving our seat. Furthermore, we might focus on one particular feature 
of what is taking place, missing another part of the performance. The idea of an ‘immediate’ 
encounter seems to imply that we can access the work directly through an instance of it, 
whereas I would argue that access is always mediated through attention and therefore 
necessarily partial. We might then extend the micro/macro work schema to suggest that the 
macro-work is impossible to access in its entirety. Rather, each person’s engagement with 
 
 
the work, via performance, is a micro-work, which is in part constructed through their 
attention.  
 
Experiencing works partially  
 
The idea of the ‘work’ is not only important in metaphysical discussions but also has real-
world implications in terms of how it informs our understanding, analysis and experience of 
performance experiences. For example, whether we feel we have fully experienced the 
work shapes how we make interpretive and analytical assertions, as demonstrated by my 
description above. Knowing that I had not experienced the entire (or macro) work of Still 
Life made me feel unsure about my reading of the work. Furthermore, my awareness of the 
partial nature of my experience of Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible fundamentally 
informed my analysis of the work. I suggest the sense of unease that was present in both 
experiences was due to the traditions of the ‘work’ and the convention, implied in Davies’ 
quote, that audiences experience works directly, and are able to ‘get’ the work by 
encountering it ‘in full’.  
 
Indeed, analytic frameworks for dance often deal with the work as a complete event which 
can be interpreted through consideration of its components. For example, key frameworks 
for dance analysis developed by Janet Adshead, Michael Huxley, Pauline Hodgens and 
Valerie Briginshaw (1988) and Susan Leigh Foster (1986) suggest that analysis of the 
structure of the work is central to understanding and interpretation. Foster’s approach 
comprises analysis of the style, vocabulary and syntax of the work, which she describes as 
its ‘structural features’ (1986: 97) and focuses on how repetition and other ordering 
principles become apparent through the analysis of the work. Adshead et al’s model 
encourages spectators to analyse and interpret the relationships between components such 
as music, movement, space and structure. This approach implies that the work’s 
components can be fully accessed, recognised and attended to. Analysis is described as 
allowing for the “minutely detailed examination” of a dance work’s parts (Adshead 1999:12, 
italics in the original). The idea that a work’s parts can be examined in such detail does not 
appear to account for the fragmentation of the viewing experience offered by works such as 
Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible and Still Life, during which the components of the 
work are not entirely available, or even the partial attention paid by spectators, which also 
occurs in more conventional theatre contexts. This model appears to assume complete 
access to a work is possible through spectatorship. 
 
Although they differ in their approaches, both these frameworks imply a viewing experience 
during which the spectator has access to all the components of a work, and these are 
encountered in a linear way. Foster acknowledges that audiences might enter and exit while 
the dancers are moving in the space (1986: 63), pointing towards how the framing of a work 
might invoke a partial experience for the viewer. However, partial experiences are not only 
created through choreographic decisions. Even in a conventional theatre-based 
performance, each person in the audience and attends differently to the person next to 
them but the tools developed to analyse dance don’t always acknowledge the role of 
attention. These models were developed over 30 years ago and both Foster’s and Adshead’s 
later work moves away from a structural approach, exploring instead frameworks such as 
kinaesthetic empathy (Foster 2010) and inter-textuality (Adshead 1999). Nevertheless, they 
 
 
have been influential in the development of subsequent frameworks for analysing dance 
and are still taught on undergraduate dance programmes, meaning that they inform 
spectatorship within the field. For example, the influence of these models can be detected 
in my analysis through my focus on the structure of both works. 
 
Still Life and Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible require different modes of attention to 
one another, and deal with the partial in different ways. However, I suggest that considering 
them alongside each other demonstrates how works might call for alternative modes of 
understanding the experience of performance. Both works rupture the conventional 
structures of performance through the way they direct the audience. The macro-work has a 
beginning and an end, but each person’s experience of the micro-works contained within 
them has its own structure, which intersects with the larger arc of the performance. In this 
way, the works relate to wider practices that move away from conventional ways of 
organising choreographic structures. For example, macro and micro works can be found in 
the types of durational performance, referred to by MacPherson, during which activity 
occurs for a prolonged period of time such as Marina Abramovich’s The Artist is Present 
(2010). During such events, audience members engage with an ongoing performance of the 
macro work for a short period of time. Often, people are able to come and go as they 
please, allowing them to determine to some extent the shape of their micro work. Another 
example is Simon Ellis and Shannon Bott’s work Inert (2006) was performed for two 
audience members who occupied different positions in space in order to experience two 
different sides or micro-works of the same macro-work. The macro/micro work framework 
is also relevant to works made up of multiple episodes, such as 52 Portraits (2016) by 
Jonathan Burrows, Matteo Fargion and Hugo Glendinning and Benjamin Millepied’s Marfa 
Dance Episodes (2017). Both of these works exist only online and comprise multiple 
individual films, which were originally transmitted individually. Conceptualising each 
individual film as a micro-work helps to make sense of the relationship between the work 
and its multiple parts and allows us to articulate what it is that we have seen when we have 
had an experience of a work that is simultaneously partial and complete.  
 
Furthermore, the micro/macro work structure can also help us to account for the way that 
we attend only partially even in more conventional theatre contexts. Even in contexts where 
the spectator is present for the entire duration of the work and able to see all of the actions 
presented by the performers, their attention shapes what it is that they encounter and is 
therefore necessarily partial. Each viewing experience therefore cultivates a micro-work, 




Reflecting on my experience of Still Life and Papier mutliforme et Papier Comestible 
highlights how our individual ways of engaging and awareness of the partial nature of our 
experience is central to understanding and analysing the works. My experience of these 
works gave rise to questions about mobility, stillness, agency and spectacle. These questions 
arose through my consideration of the form, structure and content of the works alongside 
my conscious questioning of what come before, is yet to come, or takes place alongside, 
giving rise to a form of spectatorship during which I was continually questioning my own 
knowledge of the work and ability to interpret it appropriately. I suggest that these 
 
 
experiences highlight the partial nature of all spectatorship, calling into question 
philosophical and analytic paradigms that imply spectators are able to experience a work 
directly or in full.  
 
The discourses in philosophical aesthetics and dance analysis that I have discussed seem to 
similarly imply that we can encounter a work in its entirety. They seem to arise from the 
consideration of art works that follow conventional structures and allow the spectator to 
see all of the components at once. Considering two works which move against these 
traditions, reveals how spectatorship is always partial and that therefore they ways we think 
about what the work is and what it means to experience it require rethinking. The 
macro/micro work schema draws attention to the way that an experience can be 
simultaneously partial and complete and offers a starting point to further interrogate the 
ways that experience and ontology interact.  In order to further probe this area, I suggest 
we need to continue to examine works which push at the edges of the conventions in dance 
regarding structure, duration and form and rethink what is means to engage with and 
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